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Abstract  
It is noteworthy that intra-firm technology transfer has grown rapidly in recent years as a major part 
of international technology transfer. This paper presents empirical analysis of the effect of stronger 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) on technology transfer from parent firm to its subsidiaries in foreign 
country. The results of empirical test, based on the firm-level panel data of Japanese MNCs’ foreign 
subsidiaries, present that the stronger protection of IPRs has a positive effect on the promotion of intra-firm 
technology transfer after controlling market specific factors in the host countries as well as 
parent-subsidiary firm specific factors. They are consistent with our theoretical prediction and also the 
results of the previous studies based on US firm-level data. 
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1. Introduction 
It is noteworthy that international technology transfer has grown rapidly in recent years. In 
addition to the increasing international trade of software and the brisk arm’s length transaction of 
technology through international licensing contracts, intra-firm technology transfers, in particular, 
have become active due to the globalization of firms. Foreign direct investment (hereafter “FDI”), 
which has been increasing in recent years, transfers the technology for production with capital and 
management resources. FDI therefore is an important channel for current international technology 
transfer. As in the case of licensing contracts, technology transfer through FDI is envisaged to the 
delicate problem of technology spillover. As firms establish overseas production plants through FDI, 
they must embrace the problem that technology will spillover to local firms more easily as compared 
with the international trade of commodities. This will facilitate the local firms to catch up with the 
advanced technology of multinational firms. Since FDI involves the transfer of state-of-the-art 
technology from parent firms to their affiliates, the spillover of advanced technology through FDI 
becomes more serious than the technology outflow through licensing contracts. This is a major reason 
why the international rules in recent years have focused on agreements that prevent the free imitation 
of technology. A typical example is the conclusion of TRIPS agreement with GATT/WTO after which 
the WTO member countries have begun to strengthen the protection and enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights (hereafter “IPRs”).   
The issue regarding how largely the strengthening of IPRs affects technology transfers 
through licensing contracts and FDI is of great interest in international economics. Helpman (1993), 
Yang and Maskus (2001), and Glass and Saggi (2002) provided theoretical analyses of the effect of 
stronger IPRs on the innovation in the north and the economic welfare in the south. These studies 
present that how the strengthened IPRs affect the innovation and welfare depends on whether stronger 
IPRs promote the technology transfer. There are some empirical studies related to the effect of IPRs on 
the international transactions. Maskus and Penubarti (1995) showed that stronger IPRs encourage the 
imports using the industry-level data of manufacturing sectors in OECD and 25 developing countries. 
Lee and Mansfield (1996) presented that the weaker enforcement of IPRs in 14 developing countries 
reduces the FDI inflow from the United States and lowers the proportion of FDI in manufacturing and   2
R&D to total FDI by using firm-level data 14 U.S. chemical firms. Smith (1999, 2001) showed that 
stronger enforcement of IPRs in foreign countries increases the export from the United States and the 
sales of affiliate firms and the technology licensing of U.S. multinationals by using the data of the 
countries-pair transaction between the United States and foreign countries. Smith (2001) further 
showed that the enforcement of IPRs in foreign countries affect the sales of affiliate firms and the 
technology licensing more largely than the export to foreign countries.   
It is essential to focus on the firm behavior because the technology transfer is closely related 
to corporate decision-making process. The previous studies, however, did not examine explicitly the 
effect of IPRS on the corporate decision. There are only a few empirical studies focusing on the effects 
of IPRs on the corporate decision of international transaction. Javorcik (2004) observed a positive 
correlation between the enforcement of IPRs and the decision on FDI by using the firm-level data of 
MNCs which invested in Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union during 1989-1994. 
Branstetter et al. (2006) examined the effects of IPRs on technology transfer from U.S parent firms to 
their affiliate firms for the period 1982-1999 in 12 countries by using the panel data of U.S. firms and 
found a significant increase in the royalty fee when IPRs were strengthened in the host countries. 
There are no other empirical studies of technology transfers focusing on firm behavior as long as we 
know. The reason for such a limited number of empirical examinations at the firm level is due to the 
unavailability of data needed for empirical examinations. International technology transfers for 
country or industry are clarified to a certain extent as part of the balance of payments statistics. 
However, the availability of the firm-level data is extremely limited. 
The purpose of this paper is to further examine the effect of stronger enforcement of IPRs on 
international technology transfer, along with the previous literatures. It, however, is different from 
previous studies in two points. First, it provides a theoretical framework based on the firm’s decisions 
to examine whether the corporate decision of technology transfer is affected by stronger IPRs or not. It 
also presents how market-specific factors and firm-specific factors affect the firm-level decision of 
technology transfer. The idea of analytical framework is summarized as follows. A firm establishes its 
subsidiary which manufactures goods in the host country. The parent firm determines the level of 
manufacturing technology to be transferred to the subsidiary. In the host country, there exists a local   3
firm that manufactures goods using imitated technologies. The foreign subsidiary and the local firm, 
which compete each other in the market of host country, decide the production volume in order to 
maximize their profits. As a result, a Cournot-Nash equilibrium is established in the market. The 
government of the host country is under the obligation to strengthen the IPRs in accordance with 
international agreements to limit the free imitation of technology. This increases the production cost 
for the local company. Since the stronger IPRs protection by the host country’s government lowers the 
production activities of the local firm, this, in turn, will cause a rise in the production volume and 
profit of the foreign subsidiary, and also a positive effect on the optimal level of technology transfer 
determined by the parent firm which maximizes the profit for the group of parent and subsidiary firms. 
This theoretical framework predicts that the stronger protection of IPRs accelerates technology 
transfer. 
The second contribution of this paper is the unique empirical test of the theoretical 
framework that stronger international IPRs accelerate technology transfers, based on the panel data of 
Japanese multinational firms. The use of firm-level data is indispensable for empirical analysis of 
corporate strategy such as technology transfer. Some studies used firm-level data of Europe and the 
United States; however, there is considerable scope for improvement since the coverage of data is 
insufficient. As mentioned before, technology transfers occur between a parent firm and its affiliate as 
well as in the form of arm’s length licensing contracts. In this paper, we chose the former as an 
objective for analysis since it is difficult to obtain firm-level data for the latter. In this study, empirical 
analysis is carried out using the micro-level data of Japanese firms with a large sample size included in 
the  Basic Survey of Overseas Business Activities and the Basic Survey of Corporate Activities 
conducted by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. The results of the empirical analysis have 
revealed that stronger IPRs have a positive effect on the promotion of intra-firm technology transfers. 
The analyses of this paper will positively support the motivation of international efforts to 
the establishment and harmonization of appropriate enforcement of IPRs under the international 
framework  including  WIPO  and  WTO.     
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the following section, we present a 
theoretical framework to analyze the effect of IPRs protection on technology transfer. Section 3 presents the equation and methodology for the empirical estimation. Section 4 presents the data used 
for the empirical analysis and the estimated results. The final section comprises our conclusion and 
discusses remaining issues. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 
2.1 Model Structure 
The means of technology transfer are not simple. There are various channels of technology 
transfer including international trade of goods and services, licensing contracts, and international 
movements of engineers as well as the supply of technology from a parent to its subsidiary through 
FDI. As mentioned in the previous section, this section presents a framework for analyzing the effect 
of stronger IPRs on technology transfer from the parent firm to its subsidiary in the host country. 
Technology transfer through FDI can be divided into two stages: In the first stage, technology flows 
from the parent company to its subsidiary, and in the second stage, the technology held by the 
subsidiary is diffused to the local companies. In this paper, we focus on the first stage as a subject of 
analysis. When we consider technology transfer as a process that ultimately ends in the diffusion of 
technology to the local economy, the second stage is an indispensable process as the technology 
transfer. However, the second stage of technological diffusion occurs through various routes and is 
extremely difficult to be specified by statistical data. Therefore, this paper concentrates the analysis to 
the first stage. 
The structure for the analysis is as follows. There are two firms in host country H, firm H 
and firm F: firm H is the local firm whose manufacturing technology is obtained through imitation, 
firm F is the subsidiary of a parent firm located in country F. The manufacturing technology used by 
the subsidiary firm is transferred from the parent firm. We assume that the two firms form a duopoly 
of the Cournot-Nash type in the host country’s market. In other words, both firms manufacture the 
same goods which are sold only in the host country’s market. 
For simplification, we define the demand for the goods as follows:   
) ( ) (
* * x x a x x p + − = +       ( 1 )  
  4where  x  and    indicate the production volume of firm H and firm F, respectively, a is the market 
size, and 
* x
p   is the price. The profit of the local firm H,  π , is defined as follows: 
x c x x xp c x x τ τ π − + = ) ( ) , , , (
* *    (2) 
where   denotes the given marginal cost of production, and  c τ  indicates the imitation cost of 
production technology. An increase in  τ   implies an increase in the imitation cost, thereby increasing 
the marginal cost. Hence, strengthening the IPRs in the host country causes an increase in  τ . 
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where denotes the given marginal cost of production, and
* c T denotes the level of the technology 
transferred from the parent firm to firm F. The second term in the right-hand side of equation (2*) 
implies that an increase in the amount of technology T transferred from the parent firm raises the 
productivity of the subsidiary firm, and hence, lowers the marginal cost of production. We assume that 
the firm F must pay an additional cost    to absorb a unit of technology transferred from the parent 
firm. The firm F also must pay an amount of the royalty fee to the parent firm for a compensation of 
technology transferred. The royalty fee, on the other hand, is the revenue of parent firm. The royalty 
payment of the subsidiary to the parent firm is cancelled out by the receipt of the parent firm as we 
assume that the strategy of parent firm is to maximize the total profit of parent and affiliate firms. 
Therefore we omit the royalty payment of the subsidiary to the parent firm in equation (2*). 
m
 
2.2 Optimal Level of Transferred Technology 
The variables to determine the market equilibrium are (i) the production volumes of the two 
firms, (ii) the IPRs policy determined by the government of host country H, and (iii) the amount of 
technology transferred from the parent firm. Let us assume a multi-stage one shot game in the decision 
of the optimal level of transferred technology as follows: 
(1) The government of country H determines the level of IPRs protection τ  under the 
  5international obligation. One example is the strengthening of the protection of Patent Right 
based on the WTO/TRIPS agreement. 
(2) In response to the stronger IPRs protection, the parent firm of firm F determines the level of 
technology  T   to be transferred to firm F so as to maximize the profit of firm F.   
(3) Both firm H and firm F simultaneously determine their production volumes,  x  and  , 
respectively, in order to maximize their profits under the given IPRs protection level and the 
given level of technology transferred. We assume that the firm F follows the decision of the 
parent firm. 
* x
The backward induction of this multi-stage one shot game leads to the following equilibrium. 
First, equations (3) and (3*) are obtained from the first-order conditions to maximize the profits,  π  
and  , respectively: 
∗ π
0 2
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  6As we assume that the parent firm of firm F determines technology level  T  so as to maximize  , 
the first-order condition of equation (7) with respect to 
* π
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From the equation (8), the optimal level of transferred technology, denoted by 
* T , is determined by 
the IPRs protection level τ , the absorption cost  and marginal costs   and  , under a given 
market size a : 
m c
∗ c
0 2 ) (
4
9 * * 3 *
* = + + − c T c a mT
c
τ     (9) 
 
2.3 Effect of Changes in IPRs on Technology Transfer 
By taking a total differentiation of equation (9) with respect to the optimal technology level 
* T and the IPRs protection level τ , the effect of change in the IPRs protection τ  on the optimal 
technology level 
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T . In other words, the stronger 
protection of IPRs, that is a rise of τ , results in the increase of technology transfer under the 
condition that the optimal technology level 
* T   is beyond a certain level.   
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The theory of “learning by doing” leads to that the larger the R&D expenditure of the firm, 
the higher the capability to absorb new technology. We also assume that the subsidiary’s capability to 
absorb new technology reflects the absorption capability of the parent firm. Then, we assume that the 
larger R&D expenditure of the parent firm induces the lower cost of the subsidiary firm to absorb the 
transferred technology. Under this assumption, we predict that the absorption cost of the subsidiary is 
lower if R&D expenditure of parent firm is larger. This is thought as a parent-subsidiary pair effect. 
From the above, we can derive the following proposition: 
 
Proposition: In the region where transferred technology exceeds a certain level, the stronger IPRs 
protection in host country and the larger R&D expenditure of the parent firm in home country will lead 
to an increase in the optimal level of technology transfer. 
 
3. Model Specification for Empirical Test 
The purpose of this section is to empirically test whether the result of the theoretical analysis 
mentioned in the previous section can be applicable to the explanation of the real transaction, by using 
firm-level data of technology transfers between parent and its subsidiaries of Japanese multinational 
firms. Under the theoretical model the empirical analysis is performed to test whether the stronger 
IPRs protection in the host country and the larger R&D expenditure of parent raise the level of 
technology transfer. 
The following form is used for estimation to empirically test the effects of the factors in 
equations (10) and (11). 
 
ilt il jt
jt ilt it jt ilt
u TAX
MSIZE ln EMP ln D & R _ P ln IPR ln TF ln
ε γ
γ γ β β α
+ + +
+ + + + =
3
2 1 2 1
   ( 1 2 )  
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where   denotes the optimal level of technology transfer by the parent firm i to the subsidiary 
firm    in the period t,    denotes the level of IPRs protection in country j,   denotes 
the R&D expenditure of the parent firm i  in the period t.  ,   and   are 
included in equation (12) for controlling market and firm specific factors.   
ilt TF
l jt IPR it D R P & _
ilt EMP jt MSIZE jt TAX
  , defined by the difference in corporate tax rate between the host country and Japan, 
represents the effect of transfer pricing on technology transfer caused by the difference in corporate 
tax rate between Japan and the host country. If the corporate tax rate in the host country rises, affiliate 
firms tend to remit their profits as a pose of royalty payments in order to save the tax payment. 
Therefore, the royalty payments for technology transfer may be distorted by the difference in tax rate 
between two countries if the affiliate firms execute the royalty payment as a toll of transfer pricing. 
Hines (1995) and Grubert (1998) showed that the distortion of intra-firm royalty payment caused by 
the difference in tax rates among countries should be controlled by the tax rate in host country. Along 
with the previous studies, we control the effect of transfer pricing by including the difference in 
corporate tax rate between the host country and Japan in the equation. It is expected that the increase 
of corporate tax rate in the host country causes the transfer pricing of the affiliates to reduce their tax 
payment. We predict the coefficient of  , which is defined by the corporate tax rate in the host 
country minus the one in Japan, to be positive.   
jt TAX
jt TAX
ilt EMP , which denotes the size of subsidiary firm    measured by the number of employees 
in the period t, is used for controlling the effect of affiliate’s size.   is used to control the 
effect of market size of the host country. α is the constant,   represents the individual effect of the 




ilt ε   is the idiosyncratic error term distributed as iid. 
The results of theoretical analysis in the previous section predict the signs of coefficients as 
follows: 
0 1 > β   from equation (10) and  0 2 > β   from equation (11) 
 
We also statistically investigate whether the changes in the level of IPRs protection affect the 
  9optimal level of technology transfer. The following equation (13) which is constructed by taking the 
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The constant term α and the term    presenting the individual effect of the subsidiary i are 
no longer included in this model.   
il u
 
4. Data and Results of Estimation 
4.1 Data and Variables   
The empirical examination of this paper is characterized by the use of rich Japanese 
firm-level panel data. We use the firm-level data of the Basic Survey of Overseas Business Activities as 
the source for Japanese subsidiaries located in foreign countries and those of the Basic Survey of 
Corporate Activities as the source for parent firms. Both statistics are supplied by the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry. Due to the limited availability of the index of IPRs, the data for 
estimation cover two years: 1995 and 2001. The affiliates whose payment for technology transfer is 
missing are excluded from the sample, but the affiliates whose payment record zero are included in the 
sample. For the use of maximum sample size of the data, we construct an unbalanced panel data by 
matching the data of host countries with the firm-level data. In fact, the unbalanced panel data include 
2,269 observations of Japanese MNC’s affiliates in 33 countries. The data for estimating the effect of 
changes in explanatory variables on the change in technology transfer between two years covers, 680 
affiliates in 28 countries. 
                                                  
  10
1 Although the coefficients of equation (13) are predicted to be same as the estimated results of equation 
(12), they are not exactly same due to the difference in the sample size. As a dependent variable , we use the “affiliate’s royalty payment to its shareholders in 
Japan” of the Basic Survey of Overseas Business Activities defined by the payment of foreign 
subsidiaries to their parent firm in manufacturing sector. We computed the real value of payments 
denoted in Japanese yen in 2001 by using the GDP deflator in World Development Indicators and the 
exchange rate changes between yen and local currency.
ilt TF
2
We use the “Index of Patent Right” (hereafter “IPR”) by Park and Wagh (2002) as a proxy of 
the level of IPRs protection in each country. This index investigates the degree of patent right 
protection in the following 5 categories: (1) the coverage of patentability for major industries 
including pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and food, (2) the duration of patent rights, (3) the strictness of 
legal enforcement, (4) the ratification of international agreements related to the patent protection, and 
(5) the existence of policies that undermine the implementation of patent rights. A score between 0 and 
5 is allotted to each item according to the fulfillment. The index is constructed by the summation of 
the score of each item. Higher score of the index represents a country with a higher level of patent 
protection. Since the IPR is updated every 5 years, we have chosen two years, 1995 and 2000 for the 
estimation. The estimation in this paper covers the establishments of Japanese subsidiaries in 35 
countries which are matched to the coverage of the IPR index by Park and Wagh (2002).   
Table 1 presents the number of affiliates, total royalty payments and the IPR index by 
countries. The distribution of royalty payments is heavily skewed among countries.
3 The payment of 
Japanese affiliates in the United States accounts for half of the royalty payments of all Japanese 
affiliates in 1995, and about a third of them in 2001. On the other hand, we find a remarkable increase 
in the royalty payments of Japanese affiliates in Asian countries, especially for Indonesia and China. 
The changes in the IPR index between 1995 and 2000 present that most of countries have experienced 
the reform of IPRs.   
Table 2 shows the number of affiliates and the royalty payments by industries. The 
technology transfer is concentrated to chemicals and pharmaceuticals, general machinery, electrical 
machinery and transport machinery. We include 3-digit industry dummy variables in the estimation 
  11
                                                  
2 In case of zero value for royalty payments, we add unit value for taking natural logarithm. 
3 The similar observation is mentioned in Belderbos (2003) and Iwasa and Odagiri(2004).   12
                                                 
equation for controlling the industry specific factors.   
 
Table 1 and Table 2 
 
The R&D expenditure of each parent firm (P_R&D) is calculated by the firm-level data of 
the Basic Survey of Overseas Business Activities. The number of employees (EMP) is collected from 
the firm-level data of the Basic Survey of Overseas Business Activities. The difference in corporate tax 
between the host countries and Japan (TAX) is calculated from the Corporate Tax Rate Survey 
published by KPMG. The total industrial value added of each country (MSIZE) is collected from World 
Development Indicators. The statistical description of each data is shown in Tables 3 and 4.
4  
 
Table 3 and Table 4 
 
4.2 Methods and Results of Estimation 
We conduct the estimation by applying random effects model to equation (12) based on the 
unbalanced panel of 1995 and 2001
5 as well as carrying out the panel Tobit with random effects model 
to solve the problem that a large number of affiliates record zero value for the amount of royalty 
payment. 3-digit industry dummy variables are included in estimation equation to control industry 
specific factors. Table 5 presents the summary of the estimated results of equation (12). The results of 
Breusch-Pagan test demonstrate that the random effects model is favorable in comparison with the 





4 The royalty payment, the R&D expenditure and the total industrial value added are deflated by the GDP 
deflator and expressed in the price of 1995. 
5 Since the data we use is unbalanced panel of two years, the fixed effects model can not be applied. The 
result of our estimation based on the balanced data does not show a different result from the estimation 
based on the unbalanced data. Baltagi and Chang (1994) show that estimating only balanced data extracted 
from unbalanced data fully loses validity. Therefore, we present only the results of estimation based on the 
unbalanced data.   13
                                                 
a. IPRs Protection 
  It is notable that the coefficient of IPR is positive with a statistical significance for both the 
case [1] and [2]. In the case of the random effects model ([1] Random), the elasticity is 0.536. In the 
case of panel Tobit estimation ([2] Tobit), IPR coefficient is also positive at 0.727 with a statistical 
significance.
6 These results clearly indicate that the intra-firm technology transfer is accelerated in the 
host countries in which the protection of IPRs is strong. 
b. R&D Expenditure of Parent Firm 
As a proxy of absorption cost, we used the R&D expenditure carried out by the parent firm. 
The coefficient for R&D expenditure of the parent firm is positive with a statistical significance of 1% 
in both the estimation of the random effects model and the panel Tobit estimation. The elasticity is 
between 0.08 for [1] Random and 0.12 for [2] Tobit. The estimation results, presenting that the larger 
R&D expenditure of parent firm raises the optimal level of technology transfer, are consistent with our 
theoretical prediction that the abundance of technological knowledge of the parent firm accelerates the 
technology transfer of affiliates by lowering their absorption cost.   
c. Size of Affiliates 
The coefficients of the number of employees indicating the size of the subsidiary are 
significantly positive in both cases, while their values vary. The elasticity in the case of the panel Tobit 
estimation is greater than 1. It is natural that the larger size of affiliates increases the volume of 
technology transferred from the parent firm. 
d. Market Specific Factors 
It is noted that the coefficient of TAX is positive and significant at 1% level in the both cases. 
This result means that Japanese affiliates in the countries with a higher tax rate tend to pay more 
money for a compensation of technology transfer. This suggests that Japanese affiliates might have 
used the royalty payment as a toll of transfer pricing when the tax rates differ between Japan and the 
host countries.   
The market size of host country is found a negative effect on technology transfer. This is 
 
6 While we have omitted from the table, we found the result that the Tobit estimation using panel data is 
more appropriate than the Tobit estimation using pooling data, according to the log likelihood.   14
contradictory to the theoretical prediction that the larger size of the market will accelerate the 
technology transfer. However, looking at the distribution of countries by market size, we confirmed 
that there exist two different groups of countries: one is the group of countries for large market size 
and another is for small market size. If the propensity of market size to the increase in technology 
transfer is completely different between two groups, the estimation using the pooled data of different 
groups, for the purpose of remaining the sufficient sample size, may be inadequate. 
e. Changes in IPRs Protection 
Table 6 shows the results of estimation for equation (13). The coefficients of the changes for 
the IPRs Index, the size of affiliates and the corporate tax rate are positive with a high statistical 
significance, while those for the R&D expenditure of the parent firm and the market size of host 
country are not. It is notable that the stronger enforcement of IPRs and the increase in the size of 
affiliates raise the volume of technology transfer after controlling the effect of changes in the corporate 
tax difference between the host country and Japan.     
 
Insert Table 6 
 
The above statistical evidences suggest that stronger IPRs accelerate intra-firm technology 
transfer with a high statistical significance even after controlling the market and firm-specific factors. 
As predicted in our theoretical discussion, we can conclude that the strengthening of the IPRs between 
1995 and 2001 has positively contributed to an increasing volume of international technology transfer 
during this period. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The issue with respect to whether the stronger enforcement of IPRs under the agreement of 
WTO/TRIPS has accelerated the international transfer of technology attracts an enormous interest. As 
long as the authors know, a survey of the previous literatures reveal that very few studies have been 
attempted at the firm level although the effect of changes in IPRs on technology transfer is an aspect 
of firm-level decision. This paper presents a theoretical framework, based on the firm-level decision,   15
with regard to how stronger IPRs affect the intra-firm technology transfer, after controlling the 
market-specific factors in the host country and the firm-specific factors. Based on the theoretical 
framework, we carried out empirical tests to examine whether stronger IPRs promote intra-firm 
technology transfer across borders. Our statistical examination is the first attempt to use Japanese 
firm-level panel data which is constructed by matching the data of Japanese parent firms and their 
foreign subsidiaries to the data in the host country including the index of IPRs protection. The results 
of the empirical analysis clearly show that IPRs protection has a positive effect on intra-firm 
technology transfer after controlling the market- and firm-specific factors including the R&D 
expenditure of parent firm, the size of subsidiary, the difference in corporate tax rate between host 
country and Japan, and the market size in the host country. They reveal that technology transfers 
between parents and their subsidiaries is accelerated in countries with a high level of IPRs protection. 
We also carry out the empirical examination by using the data for the rate of change between two 
periods, the years 1995 and 2001. The estimation results confirmed that the strengthened protection of 
IPRs during the period increased the volume of technology transferred.   
The results in this paper, which are also consistent with Javorcik (2004) and Branstetter et al. 
(2006) that attempted empirical tests by using the data of Europe and the US firms, lead to a policy 
implication that the international agreement to enforce the IPRs protection should be encouraged for 
promoting the international technology transfer by MNCs. 
Lastly, we conclude by describing the remaining issues for further examination. In addition 
to intra-firm technology transfer between the parent firm and its subsidiary, we observe many licensing 
contracts for technology transfer under arm’s length transaction. This paper does not cover this issue 
because of the limitation in the availability of sufficient firm-level data. Although this paper has 
employed the index proposed by Park and Wagh (2002) as a proxy of IPRs protection of the host 
country, this index does not necessarily clearly indicate the timing in which the changes in IPRs 
protection actually occurred. These are the subjects to be further examined. In order to resolve them, 
we need the development of theoretical framework to incorporate the arm’s length transaction of 
technology in the model and the availability of the data for arm’s length transaction of technology as 
well as the information that indicates the content and timing of changes in the IPRs protection policy.  16
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Index of Patent Right 
by Park and Wagh 
(0~5)  Country 
the 
number of 
obs.  1995   2001   1995   2000  
Argentina  4 71  0 3.19 3.33 
Australia  42 3,447  4,817 3.86 4.19 
Belgium  28 1,518  555 3.90 4.05 
Brazil  50 1,056  169 3.05 3.05 
Canada  28 7,666  3,505 3.57 3.90 
Chili 1 0  - 3.07  3.41 
China  357 3,353  12,199 1.55 2.48 
Colombia  4 360  150 2.57 3.24 
Czech  Republic  2 0  0 3.19 3.52 
Denmark  4 20  0 4.05 4.19 
France  47 3,281  4,695 4.05 4.05 
Germany  105 4,219  5,667 3.86 4.52 
Greece  2 72  178 2.65 3.19 
Guatemala 1 6  - 1.08  1.70 
Hong  Kong  87 4,587  1,417 2.57 2.90 
Hungary  3 369  563 3.37 3.71 
India  30 1,181  3,891 1.51 2.18 
Indonesia  156 5,236  35,552 1.24 2.27 
Ireland  2 147  2,368 3.32 4.00 
Italy  10 61  663 4.19 4.33 
Korea  127 4,695  3,637 4.20 4.20 
Mexico  36 310  3,107 2.86 2.86 
Netherlands  44 904  2,562 4.38 4.38 
New  Zealand  14 55 11 3.86 4.00 
Poland  2 0  197 2.90 3.24 
Singapore  156 14,945  9,897 3.90 4.05 
Spain  29 482  1,101 4.05 4.05 
Sweden  5 0  0 4.24 4.38 
Thailand  237 19,651  23,326 2.24 2.24 
Turkey  3 562  2,100 1.80 2.86 
United 
Kingdom  112 3,679  4,490 3.57 4.19 
United  States  540 71,398  58,880 4.86 5.00 
Venezuela  1 - 0 2.90 2.90 
Total or Mean  2,269 153,331  185,695  3.20  3.53 
Note: This table is based on the unbalanced panel data. “-” indicates no observations in the sample of the 
year. Royalty payments in 2001 are expressed in the yen value of the 1995 price by applying the GDP 
deflator from WDI and the yen-local currency exchange rate as reported in the METI survey. 
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Table 2: Distribution of royalty payments over industries 
 
Total of royalty 
payments   Industry  number of 
observations
1995 2001 
Food and drinks  127 1,583  3,806 
Textiles 116 407  242 
Wood and pulp  33 364  997 
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals  283 11,916  33,204 
Oil 20 53  259 
Building materials  58 321  895 
Steel 57 198  232 
Nonferrous metals  45 693  951 
Metal 46 214  803 
General machinery  188 11,336  9,541 
Electrical machinery  619 40,183  69,140 
Transport machinery  408 76,967  62,683 
Precision machinery  99 3,703  932 
Other manufacturing  170 5,393  2,011 
Total 2,269 153,331  185,695 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics (1) 
 
   1995     2001 
Variable obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev   obs. Mean  Std.  Dev
TF : royalty payments from 
affiliates to parent(million Yen)  1147 133.7  1217.8    1122 165.7 804.4 
IPR : Index of Patent Rights (0~5)  1147 3.34 1.28    1122 3.60 1.08 
P_R&D : parent R&D 
expenditures (million Yen)  1147 28094.4 55680.0    1122 41290.8 74563.6 
EMP : the number of affiliate's 
employee  1147 455.5 1523.8    1122  564.4 1749.8 
MSIZE : total industrial value 
added (million $)  1147 528,000 666,000   1122 609,000 732,000 
TAX : the difference in corporate 




Table 4: Descriptive statistics (2) 
Variable obs. Mean  Std.  Dev 
ln(TFt/TFt-1) 680 0.549  2.026 
ln(IPRt/IPRt-1)  680 0.145 0.200 
ln(P_R&Dt/P_R&Dt-1) 680 0.400  1.452 
ln(EMPt/EMPt-1) 680 0.200  1.039 
ln(MSIZEt/MSIZEt-1) 680 0.195  0.166 
TAXt-TAXt-1 680 9.018 2.202 
   20
 
Table 5: Estimated Results (1) 
 
Dependent Variable: ln TF (Royalty Payments from Subsidiaries to Their Parent Firm) 
   [1]Random  [2]Tobit 
0.536   0.727 
ln(IPR): "Index of Patent Rights" in the host country 
[0.135]** [0.231]** 
0.084   0.120 
ln(P_R&D): R&D expenditures of Japanese parent firms 
[0.016]** [0.028]** 
0.633   1.157 
ln(EMP): the number of affiliate's employee 
[0.028]** [0.053]** 
-0.163   -0.282 
ln(MSIZE): total industrial value added in the host country 
[0.036]** [0.062]** 
0.025   0.047 
TAX: the corporate tax rate in host country minus the one in Japan 
[0.007]** [0.012]** 
    
Industry dummy variables  Yes  Yes 




the number of observations  2,269  2,269 
the number of groups  1,588  1,588 
R-sq:  within  0.121    
      between  0.328    
      overall  0.320    
Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test (pooling vs random 
effects) 
chi-sq = 178.7   
Pr>chi-sq = 
0.000 
   
Note: The numbers of parentheses present standard errors. 
* and ** indicate the statistical significance with 5 percent and 1 percent, respectively.     
As for panel-Tobit with random effects estimation, there were 1,167 left-censored observations, namely zero 
values in the sample. Tobit estimation using panel data is more appropriate than the Tobit estimation using 

















Table 6: Estimated Results (2) 
 





























The number of observations  680 
R-sq 0.14 
Note: The numbers of parentheses present robust standard errors. 
     * and ** indicate the statistical significance with 5 percent and 1 percent, respectively. 
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